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In classical approaches to cognition, sensory, motor, and emotional experiences are
stripped of domain-specific perceptual and sensorimotor information, and represented in a
relatively abstract form. In contrast, the embodied cognition framework suggests that our
representations retain the initial imprint of the manner in which information was acquired. In
this paper, we argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) display impair-
ments in the temporal coordination of motor and conceptual information (as shown in
gesture research) and striking deficits in the interpersonal mimicry of motor behaviors (as
shown in yawning research) – findings we believe are consistent with an embodied account
of ASD that includes, but goes beyond, social experiences and is driven in part by significant
but subtle motor deficits. In this paper, we review the research examining an embodied
cognition account of ASD, and discuss its implications.
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WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR HUMAN COGNITION TO BE
EMBODIED?
Classic models of information processing in the cognitive sciences
allow sensory, motor, and emotional experience to be represented
as stripped of their perceptual and experiential basis. In such
models, largely inspired by the metaphor of “mind as computer,”
information taken in by the different sense modalities is preserved
in memory in the form of abstract symbols, functionally separated
from the original neural systems (those involved in motor action,
vision, olfaction, and audition, for example) that encoded them in
the first place.
In contrast, the theoretical framework of embodied cognition
encompasses the notion that bodily experiences play an integral
role in human cognition, and that our experiences are stored in a
manner that maps onto the original neural systems (motor, visual,
olfactory, and auditory) that encoded them in the first place. In this
formulation, the ability to represent objects and events is subserved
by sensorimotor systems that govern interactions with objects and
events (Barsalou, 1999). When objects and events are recalled from
memory to serve action goals, the sensorimotor systems involved
in their initial representation are reactivated.
There are a number of research findings that are consistent with
this hypothesis. For example, individuals hearing a description of a
skyscraper tend to make vertical eye movements; those describing
horizontally oriented structures tend to make side-to-side move-
ments (Spivey et al., 2000). Similarly, individuals making judg-
ment about events involving forward motion (“pushing closed a
drawer”) respond more quickly if their response involves a sim-
ilar motion (forward push) than an incompatible motion (e.g.,
responding to “opening the drawer” with a forward movement)
(Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002). This suggests that envisioning the
response has activated the motor schema, thereby facilitating (or
interfering with) the subsequent response.
Embodied effects can be “offline,” as described above, or online,
concurrent, effects (as described in Niedenthal et al., 2005). For
example, in one classic study, individuals were asked to hold a
pencil in their mouths while watching cartoons (Strack et al.,
1988). In one condition, the pencil was oriented laterally, pro-
jecting away from the face; in a second condition, the pencil was
oriented parallel to the mouth. These distinct facial positions were
chosen because they activate, respectively, the musculature involve
in frowning or smiling. The dependent measure in the study
was participant judgments of cartoon humor; consistent with an
embodied model of cognition, the “smile-activating” group rated
the cartoons as significantly funnier. When subjects activated their
smile musculature, as they watched a cartoon, they found the
cartoon to be more humorous; the muscle activation influenced
their representation of the cartoon. Effects were entirely implicit;
although the relevant musculature was active, participants were
not instructed to smile per se. There are a number of similar find-
ings: when participants shake versus nod their heads (under the
guise of judging the quality of headphones), while listening to
a persuasive message, the listeners in the nodding condition are
more likely to agree with the message in subsequent evaluation
(Wells and Petty, 1980). Again, attitudes toward a stimulus are
influenced by a physical (bodily) posture enacted when the indi-
vidual encountered the stimulus; note that there is no a priori
reason why smiling while seeing something should make one find
that stimulus more humorous or pleasant, unless one is encoding
the smile posture as part of the stimulus representation. The oppo-
site is also true: when individuals’ motor movements are inhibited,
there is interference in the experience of emotion and processing
of emotional information (Niedenthal et al., 2005).
A construct that has played a role in the development of embod-
ied approaches is the notion of “affordance perception” – that is,
the qualities of objects that suggest to the perceiver how those
objects are to be used (Gibson, 1977). For example, how does one
know how to sit on a chair? Gibson (1977) proposed that qual-
ities of the chair (its affordances) are independently available as
percepts in the environment. We, as perceivers, make use of this
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information as we engage with the world. Research on children
with Developmental Coordination Disorder suggests that these
children are less aware of their own reaching capabilities (Johnson
and Wade, 2009). Based on these findings, the authors hypoth-
esize that impairments in skilled movements, generally, lead to
differences in the ability to generate and detect information about
affordances.
Casasanto and colleagues have formulated an individual dif-
ferences approach to embodied cognition. Specifically, their body-
specificity hypothesis proposes that people with “different kinds
of bodies” think differently (Casasanto, 2011). For example, they
show that right versus left-handed individuals represent abstract
concepts differently, as revealed by their spontaneous gestures
(Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto and Jasmin, 2010) and by differential
patterns of brain activity (Casasanto,2011). Certainly, this research
would suggest that individuals with different motor control abili-
ties are likely to exhibit differential cognitive representations; in
this paper, we examine this possibility for the case of autism
spectrum disorders (ASD).
There has been, to date, relatively little research directly explor-
ing representation and cognition in individuals with ASD from
an embodied perspective1. ASD refers to a developmental disorder
characterized by atypicalities in three domains: social reciprocity;
language and communication; and repetitive behavior and stereo-
typed interests. The three primary diagnoses that comprise the
autism spectrum (Autistic disorder; Asperger’s syndrome; Per-
vasive Developmental Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified, PDD-
NOS) share a similar pattern of deficits, though they differ in
severity and long-term prognosis. Individuals with PDD-NOS
typically exhibit better long-term outcomes, for example, than
those with autistic disorder. The autism “spectrum” refers to vari-
ability across these diagnoses, as well as the large variability in IQ
that can range from severe intellectual disability to the gifted range.
This research is valuable on at least two accounts (consistent
with a framework proposed in the field of developmental psy-
chopathology; Cicchetti and Rogosch, 1996). First, it holds the
potential for revealing strengths and weaknesses in the embod-
ied framework, by testing a population that presents with a wide
range of abilities in the relevant domains. We propose that deficits
in motor control and synchrony (at the cognitive and neural lev-
els, reviewed below) have downstream effects on representation.
As such, ASD may provide a useful test case for examining the
framework of embodied cognition. Second, studies of ASD from an
embodied perspective are likely to illuminate meaningful strengths
and weaknesses, and potentially core deficits, in ASD. Klin et al.
(2003) proposed that differences in embodied social cognition may
cause a broad range of symptoms and differences in ASD. In this
account, because individuals with ASD experience social stimuli
as less salient (e.g., Dawson et al., 1998), seeking out and acting
on physical rather than interpersonal stimuli, their experience of
the world is “socially disembodied.” Theories of embodied cogni-
tion predict that experience with social interaction is, essentially,
physically encoded; individuals who have less early experience with
1For example, a PubMed search for joint terms “embodied cognition” and “autism”
yielded exactly 10 published papers, out of 22,138 for the terms independently
(21,705 for “autism” and 433 for “embodied cognition”).
social contexts have reduced physical responses related to those
contexts; their representations of the contexts, and subsequent
physical responses in social contexts, are thus less automatic and
efficient. This provocative hypothesis has received little empirical
attention to date.
In this review, we provide a brief overview of embodied cog-
nition; we next describe ASD, and then review the small set of
studies that directly test embodiment effects in ASD. Based on
the literature to date, we suggest that the role of embodiment in
ASD may go beyond merely social contexts. Specifically, we pro-
pose that because motor processes are subtly impaired in ASD
(reviewed in detail below), because of noisier synchronization
of neural assemblies (Milne, 2011), or because of reduced cor-
tical connectivity (Belmonte, 2004; Just et al., 2012), sensorimotor
information may be poorly integrated across modalities. This leads
in turn to impairments in the encoding of sensorimotor repre-
sentations of the world; these noisier representations are more
difficult to access and reproduce. We suggest that, because social
representations are temporally evanescent, and complex, they are
more susceptible to noise. In this account, individuals with ASD
“embody” all their experiences differently, not just social ones; this
difference impacts social along with other processes.
The notion of embodiment – that our sensorimotor input gives
us access to the actions, emotions, and sensations, of other peo-
ple (Gallese, 2006) – seems intuitively relevant to ASD, because
individuals with ASD struggle to understand others, and to be as
automatically and implicitly engaged with other people. We now
review some potential “underpinnings” of embodiment, that may
play an important role in the symptomatology of ASD.
MOTOR SKILLS IN ASD
If an individual cannot plan or implement a motor movement
effectively, this will decrease the efficiency with which this person
can build links between motor movements and other information
(ideas, emotions, cognition, etc.). In other words, this individual
will experience a different influence of embodiment. We turn now
to a discussion of motor skills in ASD. Several decades ago, Rogers
and Pennington (1991) proposed that motor skill deficits may be
quite important in the symptomatology of ASD. This suggestion
was seconded by a review of multiple studies (Smith and Bryson,
1994). More recently, Mostofsky has proposed that motor impair-
ments are central in the phenotype of ASD (e.g., Mostofsky et al.,
2006).
A variety of studies have shown motor coordination problems
in ASD, including problems with: fine motor control (Szatmari
et al., 1990); grip planning (Hughes,1996); anticipatory movement
preparation (Rinehart et al., 2001); gait and posture (Ghazziudin
et al., 1992; Fournier et al., 2010), including shortened steps, “toe
walking,” and generally poor coordination of limb movements
(Vilensky et al., 1981); balance and coordination (Mari et al., 2003);
imitation and pantomime (DeMyer et al., 1972; Stone et al., 1997);
and reaching and grasping movements (Glazebrook et al., 2009).
Differences in motor skills may be present as early as infancy
and toddlerhood (Teitelbaum et al., 1998; Brian et al., 2008; Dow-
ell et al., 2009). For example, Teitelbaum et al. (1998) showed that
early disturbances of movement (at 4–6 months) were apparent in
home videos of infants later diagnosed with autism. Motor skills
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measured in children with ASD at age 5 years and again at age
7 years 11 months showed less improvement than in children with
ADHD or non-specific developmental delays (Van Waelvelde et al.,
2010). A study that followed a large (n= 95) group of toddlers
longitudinally found that motor skills in infancy were a strong pre-
dictor of later social and communicative outcomes in ASD (Sutera
et al., 2007) – stronger than the severity of autism symptomatology.
Motor abilities are important predictors of outcomes in ASD.
Studies have consistently found that while planned actions may
be ultimately“accurate”(e.g., individuals are able to reach for a tar-
get; see Dewey, 1993) in high-functioning autism, individuals with
ASD are likely to have movements that exhibit significantly more
temporal and spatial variability (Mostofsky et al., 2006, 2007, 2009;
Glazebrook et al., 2009). Impairment often involves subtle antic-
ipatory adjustments (Schmitz et al., 2003); for example, children
with autism fail to anticipate the motor consequences of an action’s
final goal (Cattaneo et al., 2007). Motor impairments in ASD can
be subtle (Dowell et al., 2009) or absent; one elegant study of ball-
throwing that required postural adjustment found absolutely no
differences between ASD and control groups (Gidley Larson et al.,
2008). Thus, the literature has been marked by what seem like
highly inconsistent findings. These discrepancies were addressed
in a recent review, which used a computational framework (rather
than individual measures and tasks) to divide motor control into
five components (Gowen and Hamilton, 2013). The authors con-
cluded that findings were, in fact, consistent, showing impairments
in ASD in two domains: (1) poor integration of information for
efficient motor planning, and (2) deficits in organizing motor
knowledge. They suggested that increased sensorimotor noise, and
higher level motor planning, were both important contributors to
ASD symptomatology. The issue of noisy representations as raised
in the Introduction appears to have significant support from other
domains.
There are clear parallels between the production of motion in
ASD, and its perception, reflecting the relationship between per-
ception and action more generally (Sperry, 1952). Many studies of
motion perception have used a handy methodological tool known
as “point-light displays,” a technique first described in Johans-
son (1973). In point-light displays, the participant sees a number
of small, bright, dots on a dark background; the dots move in a
coordinated fashion. Initially, the stimuli are created by fastening
actual lights on the arms and legs of a moving person, dimming
the lights, and then recording the resulting action; in this way, the
body is invisible and the observer sees only the moving points of
light. This is analogous to the real-life experience one might have
of seeing only bobbing lights in motion, when a jogger clothed in
black runs along a dark road wearing running shoes with reflec-
tive dots. Nowadays, stimuli are typically created using computer
animation rather than actual lights.
While the many point-light display studies in ASD cannot be
reviewed in detail here, one can draw several generalizations. Many
studies of biological motion perception in ASD have reported
striking differences in both behavioral and neural (especially
fMRI) responses to such displays (Atkinson, 2009; Kaiser and
Shiffrar, 2009; Nackaerts et al., 2012). These findings are not always
replicated (McAleer et al., 2011), with differences reported for
only some stimuli and tasks (Saygin et al., 2010). One potential
resolution to the conflicting findings is that, when behavioral per-
formance is carefully matched, individuals with ASD may activate
clearly distinct brain networks as observed in fMRI (McKay et al.,
2012). In other words, brain differences should only be interpreted
for tasks on which behavioral performance is similar across groups
(otherwise confounds of task difficulty/effortfulness render group
differences less interpretable). If we assume that individuals with
ASD do indeed exhibit impaired responses to point-light displays,
this suggests that their perception of physical motion in other indi-
viduals is altered, which likely is reflected in their different mimicry
abilities, reviewed next.
MIMICRY
Mental simulation refers to the process by which we compare a
representation of someone else’s thoughts, feelings, or actions, to
our own. This simulation could take place through the mediating
mechanisms of mimicry and peripheral feedback. The ability to
contrast our own with another person’s mental states has been
described as a potentially critical impairment in ASD. Mimicry,
likely one of the building blocks of mental simulation, involves
the non-volitional, implicit, automatic matching of another per-
son’s actions; it is clearly distinguished from imitation, defined
as the deliberate, explicit, effortful reproduction of another per-
son’s actions (Call and Tomasello, 1995). Many studies of typically
developing (TD) individuals have demonstrated that when two
people interact, an unconscious mimicry and synchronization of
behavior occurs, impacting body posture, facial expressions, vocal
prosody, speech patterns, emotions, and gestures (Niedenthal et al.,
2005). Furthermore, the coupling of our automatic tendency to
mimic and the effects of peripheral feedback on our inner emo-
tional states may explain the phenomenon of emotional contagion
(Hatfield et al., 1994). That is, because we unconsciously mimic the
emotional movements of others, we unconsciously feel the emo-
tions of others as we interact with them. The mimicry aspect of
embodiment is so fundamental to our everyday interactions, that
it is difficult to imagine being unaffected by the non-verbal signals
and cues of those around us. It is likely responsible, at least in part,
for why we enjoy comedic movies in a crowded movie theater more
than we might enjoy such movies when watching at home alone.
Research is still in the process of fleshing out the full cascade of
consequences that might come about as the result of an early failure
in mimicry. However, it seems likely that this failure would be cat-
astrophic. Mimicry increases feelings of closeness and connection
between individuals, which, in turn, increases the amount of mim-
icry individuals will display toward one another. One can imagine
this process continuously unfolding in a cascade between caregiver
and child throughout the early years of development. Abilities such
as imitation, joint attention, and speech develop in the context of
this increasingly synchronous bond. Strikingly, imitation (Smith
and Bryson, 1994), joint attention (Kasari et al., 1990; Charman
et al., 1997; Clifford and Dissanayake, 2008), and language (Eigsti
et al., 2011; Mayo et al., 2013) are all signal impairments in ASD.
Research has suggested interactions between mimicry and com-
munication. For example, one account describes conversation as
“joint action” (Garrod and Pickering, 2004). A dialog between
two interlocutors requires cooperation between those individuals
in order for them to understand the meaning of the dialog;
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observers who do not participate are typically less accurate in
their comprehension. The ease with which we engage in dialog,
and our comprehension in dialogs, potentially involves priming
of representations at multiple levels: phonological, lexical, syn-
tactic, and semantic (Levelt and Kelter, 1982; Branigan et al.,
2000; Hartsuiker et al., 2004). Priming reduces the effortfulness
of conversation; it is likely that priming is similar to the notion of
mimicry described above. Because individuals with ASD struggle
with many aspects of conversation, including maintaining rele-
vance, turntaking, task-switching between speaking and listening,
higher level organization of narratives, and so on, it is possible that
the model of interactive alignment provides a useful framework
for understanding pragmatic and discourse impairments in ASD2.
Impairments in mimicry potentially underlie other social
skills impairments in ASD. Adolescents and adults with high-
functioning autism do not appear to exhibit normal automatic
facial mimicry (McIntosh, 1996). Despite being able to produce
typical facial expressions deliberately and explicitly, a group of
individuals with ASD failed to exhibit mimicry of emotional
expressions monitored via electromyography (EMG) (which mon-
itors minute muscle contractions) when passively viewing emo-
tional expressions. Similarly, while viewing emotional faces, adults
with ASD had behaviorally intact performance, but decreased
autonomic arousal, measured via galvanic skin conductance
(Hubert et al., 2009). This suggests an altered implicit response
to emotional faces. It should be noted that children with autism
have been found to exhibit typical levels of autonomic arousal
when viewing others in distress (Shenk and Ramachandran, 2003;
Ben Shalom et al., 2006, November) even though children may
not respond with typical behaviors to the distress of others (Sig-
man et al., 1992; Bacon et al., 1998). These studies suggest that
when explicit and conscious behaviors are measured, responses to
emotion displays may look intact; however, when we probe “under
the hood” for more physiological responses, individuals with ASD
look atypical. Clearly, for mimicry to be available as a source of
feedback, an individual must attend to another person. Individu-
als with ASD, who often avoid looking at others, may be forced to
rely solely on top-down cognitive strategies, rather then benefiting
from bottom-up perceptually driven mimicry to understand other
people’s emotions, ideas, and thoughts.
MIMICRY, YAWNING, AND EMOTIONAL CONTAGION
In our research, we have examined in detail one form of highly
automatic mimicry: contagious yawning. Distinct from the spon-
taneous yawns that are observed in the human fetus, contagious
yawns are prompted by seeing or hearing another person yawn.
Sometimes yawning can be elicited by just reading the word; per-
haps the readers of this chapter are, even now, stretching their
jaws. Interestingly, susceptibility to contagious yawning is appar-
ently associated with self-recognition and theory of mind, two
abilities that contribute to complex empathy (Platek et al., 2003).
In our work, we tested contagious yawning in a large sample
(n= 123) of TD children, ages 1–6 years, by reading a story to
them for 12 min and deliberately yawning at four points during
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this potential link.
the reading (Helt et al., 2010). Results showed that TD children
did not exhibit contagious yawning until age four. The late onset
of contagious yawning implies that emotional contagion (a form
of embodiment) becomes more developed and more sensitive over
time, resulting in increased affective attunement with others. Fur-
thermore, as part of the same study, we used the same method
to elicit contagious yawning in a sample of 30 children with ASD
ages 6–15 years (e.g., well beyond the point when TD children
exhibit robust contagious yawning). Their responses were com-
pared to a new group of chronological-age-matched (n= 28) or
mental-age-matched (n= 28) TD children. In stark contrast to
the TD participants, none of the children with autistic disorder
and only three out of the 10 children diagnosed with PDD/NOS
(milder ASD) yawned contagiously, as compared to 43% of an
age-matched TD group. There was thus a relationship between
diagnostic severity in ASD and susceptibility to contagious yawn-
ing. We hypothesized that the relationship reflected a difficulty
in recognizing or acting on the correspondence between oneself
and others, or a deficit in mimicking emotional behavior. When a
person mimics (even unconsciously), the activation of emotional
body schemas also creates the corresponding emotional reaction
(i.e., the act of smiling causes us to feel happier, McIntosh, 1996),
a phenomenon that may facilitate understanding the thoughts
and feelings of others. Individuals with ASD may not experience
emotional contagion during the early years of development.
Another study of implicit, spontaneous mimicry asked whether
individuals with ASD are less likely to coordinate or synchronize
their actions with a significant other. In this research (reviewed in
Marsh et al., 2009), child-caregiver dyads were invited to sit in two
adjacent rocking chairs of appropriate sizes, while the adult read
aloud a book. During the reading, the adult was asked to rock her
chair in tempo with a metronome that only the adult could hear.
Analyses probed the relative synchrony of the child’s and adult’s
rocking movements. Results indicated that the children with ASD
were significantly less likely to coordinate their rocking with the
caregiver, compared to a group of TD children and their caregivers.
A third study of non-conscious mimicry in ASD examined the
kinematics of grasping objects as a tool for examining the relative
impact on one person’s behaviors on another person’s action (Bec-
chio et al., 2007). In this clever paradigm, children with autism
and children with TD matched on age and gender (IQ was not
assessed) watched a model reach out and grasp an object (in one
condition), or look at an object (in another condition). Further-
more, on some trials, a second distracter object was present on the
table. After the model completed the action (looking or grasping),
the child was told to grasp the target object; in no case was there
a distracter object in the participant’s display. Interestingly, in the
TD group, participants’ reaches to objects where there had been a
distracter for the model showed consistent kinematic differences,
even though there was no distracter present. Effects were similar
when the model simply looked at the target. In those cases, the
child’s reach showed a less efficient path. In contrast, even though
they looked as much at the model, the group with ASD showed no
such difference. The findings suggested that the participants with
autism were less influenced in their own actions by the actor’s gaze.
This, and related, research depends on the underlying integrity of
motor planning and control; that is, if motor control is impaired
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in ASD, as reviewed above, one would expect differences in all
motor tasks; these differences may reflect not sociocommunica-
tive impairments, but in reaching, grasping, and so on. In fact,
in Becchio et al.’s (2007) reaching study, participants with ASD
showed intact motor control in some conditions, but not others,
allowing us to attribute performance impairments to differences
in those conditions.
CONVERSATIONAL GESTURES AND EMBODIMENT IN ASD
We turn now to a discussion of a phenomenon that we propose
provides support for the possibility that even subtle differences in
motor control in ASD have significant consequences, potentially
reflecting a developmental difference in embodiment. Gestures –
the spontaneous manual movements that accompany speech – are
an important form of non-verbal communication that may facil-
itate early language learning and knowledge acquisition (McNeill,
1992). One category of gesture that is particularly relevant for
the current paper is that of iconic gestures, which depict physical
properties of referents. Iconic gestures often provide information
that complements the information in the co-occurring speech. For
example, a throwing motion can add information to the statement
that “he threw the coconut,” for example by showing the direc-
tion (over to the left ), or the manner (with excitement versus with
anger) of the throwing action. Such gestures are informative about
semantic representations.
Gestures undergo a similar developmental course as that of
speech in language acquisition. In TD children, gestures precede
first words (Bates et al., 1975) and may often substitute for spe-
cific lexical items (Acredolo and Goodwyn, 1988). Longitudinal
studies have shown that children enter the first-word stage (at
10 months) producing more gestures than words (Capirci et al.,
2005). The majority of objects to which children refer during
this period are referred to first in gesture; they emerge in speech
approximately 3 months later (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2007). Sim-
ilarly, gesture-speech combinations (e.g., pointing to a hat while
saying “dada”) emerge before two-word phrases (e.g., “dada hat,”
McEacherns and Haynes, 2004; Özçaliskan and Goldin-Meadow,
2005; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2007). Gestures may facilitate early
language development by offering an opportunity for symbolic
representation without the complex motor sequences required
by speech.
One influential theory proposes that gestures originate from the
interface of speech and visuospatial thinking (Kita and Ozyurek,
2003); they are shaped by language and simultaneously express
information that may not be encoded in speech (viz., visuospatial
and motoric properties). Perhaps even more relevant to the current
account is the“Gesture as Simulated Action”theory (Hostetter and
Alibali, 2008). In this account, language (and gesture) involve sim-
ulations of perception and action that activate or reactivate percep-
tion and action states. Gesture specifically involves the simulation
of motor and perceptual components of visuospatial imagery. In
both theories, gestures encode visuospatial and motoric properties
of lexical referents; in this role, gestures serve as the manifestation
of action in a virtual environment. In other words, conversa-
tional gestures reflect the operation of embodied cognition, a notion
supported by numerous empirical findings (Hanlon et al., 1990;
Hansen et al., 2008; Iverson and Thelen, 1999; Kita and Ozyurek,
2003). Furthermore, hand gestures have a substantial impact on
listeners, whose interpretations and subsequent movements are
reliably affected by characteristics of speakers’ gestures (McNeill
et al., 1994; Cook and Tanenhaus, 2009).
Gesture is thought to be specifically impaired in ASD, a fact
reflected in the diagnostic criteria, in which gesture, and its inte-
gration with speech, is mentioned in numerous symptom criteria
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The absence of pointing
gestures (known as deictics) is considered an early warning sign
of ASD; both the comprehension and production of deictics are
found to be reduced (Mundy et al., 1986) and delayed (Camaioni
et al., 1997) in ASD. Pointing is also often associated with joint
attention, a major developmental milestone that involves sharing
experiences with others (Mundy and Stella, 2000). Gestural joint
attention skills are associated with language skills in children with
ASD, such that children with reduced deictic use (for the purpose
of drawing someone else’s attention to an object or event) are more
delayed in early language acquisition (Loveland and Landry, 1986;
Mundy et al., 1990; Bono et al., 2004). A reduced gestural reper-
toire has been observed in ASD (Wetherby and Prutting, 1984;
Colgan et al., 2006), such that gestures fulfill fewer communicative
functions.
Interestingly, most studies have failed to find group differences
in rates of gesturing, after controlling for the amount of speech
(Attwood et al., 1988; Capps et al., 1998). Rather than differences
in gesture rate, or quantity, research and clinical description have
both reported differences in gesture quality, including reduced
synchrony with speech (Tantam et al., 1993), and “oddness” of
greeting waves (Hobson and Lee, 1998). The unusual quality of
gestures produced by individuals with ASD has long been noted in
clinical accounts of the disorder. For example, Wing (1981) cites
odd gestures in her case descriptions: “he uses large, jerky, inap-
propriate gestures to accompany speech” (Wing, 1981, p. 126).
Similarly, Hans Asperger’s original account of the disorder noted
the “large,” “clumsy,” and “inappropriate” gestures of the patients
he described Asperger (1944), from Wing (1981). The odd quality
of gestures, and their poor integration with speech, were noted by
these influential clinicians.
Given these suggestive impressions that gesture quality may dif-
fer, our group examined the spontaneous gestures of adolescents
with (n= 15) and without (n= 15) ASD, matched on age (ages
12–17), language level, and non-verbal IQ, as they told a story
based on six cartoon prompts (de Marchena and Eigsti, 2010).
There were striking group profiles. The adolescents with ASD pro-
duced as many gestures as their peers; there were large individual
differences within each group, with some participants producing
as few as two gestures during their story, and some producing as
many as 23. However, their gestures were poorly synchronized with
the semantically related speech. That is, in the ASD group, gestures
were likely to either precede or follow the relevant speech by a lag
of (on average) 333 ms. Furthermore, we asked raters (typical col-
lege students, entirely naïve to diagnosis and study questions) to
judge the spontaneous narratives for clarity, how well the student
could imagine the action, etc. Results indicated that the degree to
which a narrative included poorly coordinated speech and ges-
tures correlated strongly with ratings of communicative quality.
It was also associated with ASD symptom severity. This kind of
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speech-gesture asynchrony appears to violate basic requirements
for gestural comprehension (Habets et al., 2010), and it also seems
to have devastating consequences for communication.
Gesture-speech coordination requires the efficient mobiliza-
tion and ordering of distinct behaviors. There is a growing liter-
ature demonstrating impairments in behavioral timing in ASD.
For example, electrophysiological studies have shown delayed
responses to social stimuli by children with ASD, compared to TD
peers (McPartland et al., 2004; Webb et al., 2006). A recent study
of mimicry that measured facial muscle activity (via electromyo-
graphy) showed that children with ASD differed from TD peers
only in their latency to mimic (Oberman et al., 2009). Although
the amount and appropriateness of mimicry was comparable, chil-
dren with ASD took longer to mimic, suggesting that deficits in
interpersonal synchrony were driven primarily by inefficient tim-
ing of behaviors, rather than by the execution of the behaviors
themselves. Timing impairments are also present in non-social
cognitive processes. For example, an intriguing study asked adults
with and without ASD to complete an eyeblink conditioning pro-
cedure (Sears et al., 1994). In this task, a beep (tone) reliably
precedes the delivery of a puff of air to the eye, eliciting an eyeblink.
After training with tone-puff pairs, the individual receives a tone
in isolation; when the individual blinks in response to the tone-
alone stimulus, this is taken as evidence that the individual has
learned the tone-puff association. In the Sears et al. (1994) study,
the adults with ASD did show conditioned learning; however, their
blink response was produced at a maladaptive interval, such that
the eye reopened to its maximal aperture just as the puff of air
arrived. Gesture deficits are also consistent with the hypothesis
that individuals with ASD exhibit deficits in multi-modal sen-
sory integration, as has been found for visual speech (lipreading)
effects on auditory perception (Smith and Bennetto, 2007) and for
temporal asynchrony between auditory and visual linguistic cues
(Bebko et al., 2006).
Models of embodiment specify that the neural state that
obtained when a stimulus was first encountered impacts subse-
quent processing of that stimulus. If timing impairments mean
that the “initial state” is less clearly defined (e.g., that a given stim-
ulus is not tightly coupled to the individual’s motor action), this
should lead to relatively weaker embodiment effects. The above
evidence of poor behavioral timing and synchrony in ASD is
certainly consistent with this possibility. Furthermore, there is a
relevant literature addressing the ease of performance of behaviors.
Those behaviors that are performed frequently are well-learned
and have a low threshold; in contrast, novel or very infrequent
behaviors have a higher threshold.“Activation”refers to the relative
strength of the behavior once the threshold is reached. A critical
assumption is that the dynamic coupling of two systems – e.g., two
limbs, or limbs and oral structures – requires relatively high levels
of activation in order for mutual entrainment to occur. There is
strong evidence of reduced information integration in ASD that
is the direct consequence of decreased connectivity of local neural
assemblies and of overconnectivity within local assemblies (Brock
et al., 2002; Belmonte et al., 2004; Just et al., 2004, 2007; Rippon
et al., 2007; Wicker et al., 2008). One suggestion from this litera-
ture is thus that, if an individual has activation that spreads less
smoothly between brain regions (because of reduced connectivity,
for example), that individual will be less able to mutually entrain
a given system.
One strategy for addressing the question of whether “embod-
iment” is as strong an influence on individuals with ASD, is to
examine directly embodied processes in that population. If a task
were relatively non-social in nature, this would permit us to test
specifically embodiment effects without the confound of whether
an individual with ASD performs differently just because of a life-
time of reduced social interest and engagement. Although no such
studies have been conducted to date, this research is in progress in
our lab.
NEURAL MECHANISMS OF ASD: SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES IN
EMBODIMENT
Some of the research on embodiment differences in ASD has been
behavioral, but there are also several important pieces of evi-
dence suggesting a solid neurophysiological foundation for these
differences. Perhaps the most influential has been the documen-
tation of reduced functional connectivity between distant brain
regions in ASD (Belmonte, 2004; Just et al., 2004; Kana et al.,
2006). Decreased connectivity between prefrontal and other cor-
tical regions is specifically implicated in sociocognitive processing
deficits in ASD (Wicker et al., 2008), and many researchers describe
functional connectivity as tightly linked to these functional brain
differences (Klin et al., 2003).
The cerebellum is involved in the timing and integration of
behaviors, and has been shown to be anatomically atypical in
ASD in multiple studies (Courchesne et al., 1988; Ritvo and
Garber, 1988). Eyeblink conditioning, mediated by the cerebel-
lum, requires rapid and precise timing, and is highly impaired in
ASD (Sears et al., 1994), as described above. This autism-specific
impairment is particularly striking, because 1- to 2-day-old new-
borns demonstrate eyeblink conditioning during sleep (Fifer et al.,
2010); it is an early mastered ability. The cerebellum also controls
the timing of behaviors that have both a cognitive and a motor
component (Glickstein, 2006), and that require close synchrony
(Katz and Steinmetz, 2002), such as speech production (Acker-
mann et al., 2004). Given all the differences in timing, temporal
coordination, and synchrony, that seem to characterize ASD, and
the importance of those processes for embodiment, researchers
have looked carefully for specific links between cerebellar structure
and function, and embodied processes.
MIRROR NEURON SYSTEM AND EMBODIMENT IN ASD
In addition to general discussions of functional connectivity
and the cerebellum, many researchers have been excited by the
prospect that the neural “architecture” underlying the mecha-
nism of embodied cognition might be the mirror neuron system
(MNS; Niedenthal, 2007; Gallese et al., 2013). The MNS refers
to a set of neurons that fire when an action is executed and also
when that same action is merely observed ; as such, they appear
to encode the observation and execution of action (Oztop and
Arbib, 2002; Williams, 2008). Regions involved in MNS process-
ing include the ventral part of the precentral gyrus, the posterior
part of the inferior frontal gyrus, the rostral part of the inferior
parietal lobe, and regions within the intraparietal sulcus and the
superior temporal sulcus (Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 2009). Mirror
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neurons have also been identified in supplementary motor area,
an area mainly dedicated to movement initiation and sequencing,
and medial temporal lobe, principally involved in memory tasks.
Premotor areas active during the execution and the observation
of an action may also be involved in the intention promoting the
action (Gallese, 2006).
Research on the MNS suggests that social interaction draws on
the capacity to predict and understand the motor goals and motor
intentions of others, through their actions, and that this ability
is instantiated in the cortical motor system organization via the
MNS. It is possible that this network is established very early in
development; studies of infants have suggested that there is“motor
simulation”activity in premotor and posterior parietal cortex (Shi-
mada and Hiraki, 2006). Mirror neurons respond most strongly
to behaviors that are in our own behavioral repertoire (Buccino
et al., 2004), implying that the more idiosyncratic a child’s emo-
tional expressions and behaviors are, the less likely they may be to
trigger mimicry in those around him.
While the MNS is an excellent candidate for serving as the
neural substrate for embodiment, there is considerable controversy
about its existence in humans and its specificity for understanding
the symptomatology of ASD. While the original MNS data from
primates are widely accepted, many researchers disagree about the
existence and nature of the MNS system in humans. There is dis-
agreement about the specific location of the mirror neurons; about
whether there is a specific interconnected system of these neurons;
and about whether there are systematic differences between neu-
rons that perform mirroring functions, or whether any neuron
can take on this function (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007). One review
has suggested that the MNS hypothesis provides a useful model
for understanding ASD, because “across the spectrum of autism-
related disorders, it appears to be the cognitive functions that are
embodied by action that are most affected” (Williams, 2008, p.
84). In sharp contrast, a more recent review of neuroimaging stud-
ies (Hamilton, 2013) concluded that studies using non-emotional
hand action stimuli typically reveal no group differences, conclud-
ing that there is little evidence for global dysfunction of the mirror
neuron system (Hamilton, 2013). More research is required to
better understand the dynamics and anatomical substrates of the
MNS in humans.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
While there have been no direct tests of embodied processes
in ASD, we hypothesize that ASD is characterized by a relative
decrease or lack of embodiment. That is, the stimuli that an indi-
vidual with ASD encounters may be less bound to the sensory and
motor conditions that held when that stimulus was first encoun-
tered. Because individuals with ASD seem to have motor deficits,
involving poor integration of information for motor planning, and
deficits in higher level motor planning, it seems possible that motor
deficits contribute to a weakened role of embodied processing in
functioning in individuals with ASD.
Language acquisition research provides evidence consistent
with this possibility. For example, Linda Smith and colleagues have
suggested an important role for sensorimotor functions in early
word learning (Yu and Smith, 2012). That is, TD infants were most
likely to learn words when the object to which a word referred was
visually dominant, according to eyetracking data, and when they
were physically manipulating those objects. Yu and Smith (2012)
suggested that the infant’s visual focus on a specific object during
naming, along with the infant’s handling of the object, served to
reduce referential ambiguity. These behaviors were better predic-
tors of the infant’s later word knowledge than was parent verbal
labeling. Sensory-motor behaviors of infants and parents seemed
to create optimal visual moments for learning, playing a stronger
role in word learning than verbal naming by parents. These find-
ings suggest that for language acquisition, sensorimotor cues help
to constrain the learning process. If such constraints were not oper-
ating as efficiently in toddlers with ASD, due to motor control or
sensorimotor integration deficits, one would anticipate language
delays, as are found in ASD (Eigsti et al., 2007).
Given the pattern of findings described here, we suggest that
there are (at least) three possible explanations for embodiment dif-
ferences in ASD. Note that these explanations are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.
1. The original encoding of stimulus information could be fuzzier.
That is, information from the sensory and motor systems that
encoded a stimulus may be less efficiently encoded in the rele-
vant brain regions. This could reflect reduced connectivity, in
that input from one sensory system (e.g., vision) is less synchro-
nized with input from a second system (e.g., motor action or
audition). In this case, the performance of individuals with ASD
should be related in important ways to patterns of performance
on learning and memory tasks.
2. Embodiment is, fundamentally, a motor output/motor plan-
ning problem. This seems possible given the many deficits in
motor functioning reviewed above. For example, if the par-
ticipants in embodied cognition paradigms are simply less
effective at generating the appropriate physical postures, one
would predict a reduced embodiment effect.
3. It is differences in attentional focus that govern the choice of
experiences that are stored for later reactivation. Individuals
with ASD are broadly less attentive to social, interpersonal,
emotional information,and thus are likely to encode such infor-
mation less accurately. Under this hypothesis, performance in
ASD should improve for stimuli that are especially salient or of
interest to an individual; this might be tested using stimuli for
which the individual has a stereotyped or repetitive interest.
In general, it is of course true that development in TD individ-
uals is shaped and sculpted by embodied processes. In particu-
lar, embodiment appears to be a particularly direct pathway for
understanding the implications or associations of information. If
individuals with ASD do not have access to this rich source of infor-
mation, they must rely on alternative pathways to learn. Of course,
in life, many important cues arrive via social interactions; this may
explain why prior discussions of embodiment in ASD were limited
to social cognition and social embodiment. The current data seem
to suggest a broader reach of embodiment impairments in ASD.
These data raise several points to consider for intervention.
Speaking generally, children with ASD benefit from explicit
teaching of motor action and facilitating top-down mecha-
nisms to bolster the less-active, implicit, bottom-up processes.
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These are processes that TD children use “for free” – that is,
they engage bottom-up embodiment processes without explicit
attention or effort. It is possible that explicitly directing chil-
dren with ASD to adopt particular facial expressions or body
postures, may help explicitly “entrain” the body with embodi-
ment.
While data are limited, one study is consistent with this sugges-
tion (Yilmaz et al., 2004). This intervention study involved teaching
of a swimming intervention (“hydrotherapy”) to individuals with
ASD. In addition to the benefits to physical health, including gains
in balance, speed, agility, strength, flexibility, and endurance, this
could potentially enhance motor control and motor planning and
lead to downstream improvements in implicit mimicry, emotional
contagion, and so on. Interventionists already engage in such
explicit teaching of top-down approaches to skills in ASD, such
as eye contact, that are absolutely critical in good social interac-
tion. The current review also suggests that dyadic approaches that
involve synchronization or mimicry training, perhaps via EMG,
may also be a powerful approach.
While evidence of embodiment “impairments” in ASD is lack-
ing, the collective impact of relevant studies reviewed here suggests
that the time has come for a direct test of embodied processes in
ASD.
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